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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
This Petition for Review by Appellee Ollie Blair is from a final order of
the Labor Commission of Utah dated July 15, 2010.

This Court has

jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§ 34A-2801(8)(a), 63G-4-403, and 78-2a-3(2)(a).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Issue: Does Respondents' admission of medical causation preclude
Respondents from challenging the extent of further compensability
under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-418.
Standard of Review
The Legislature has granted the Commission discretion to

determine the facts and apply the law to the facts in all cases coming
before it. As such, the Court must uphold the Commission's
determination unless the determination exceeds the bounds of
reasonableness and rationality."' McKesson Corp. v. Labor Comm'n, 2002
UT App 10, 111, 41 P.3d 468 (alterations omitted) (quoting AE Clevite,
Inc. v. Labor Comm'n, 2000 UT App 35, P7, 996 P.2d 1072). Whether a
party waived a defense is reviewed for reasonableness. See Barnard &
Burk Group, Inc. v. Labor Comm'n, 2005 UT App 4 0 1 , If 5 (Utah Ct. App.
2005).
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2.

Issue: Did the Commission apply the appropriate legal analysis?
Standard of Review
Under Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403 (4)(d), the Court of Appeals

may grant relief from an agency action if the agency "has erroneously
interpreted or applied the law." Whether an agency has properly
interpreted or applied agency-specific law is reviewed for correctness,
unless an agency h a s been given a measure of discretion by statute.
Harrington v. Industrial Comm'n, 942 P.2d 961, 963 (Utah Ct. App.
1997); Terry v. Ret. Bd.. 2007 UT App 87, P7 (Utah Ct. App. 2007); Drake
v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997).
3

Issue: Where the Commission's findings of fact on the material
issue of future medical care adequate under Utah law?
Standard of Review
Adequacy of an agency's factual findings is a question of law,

reviewed for correctness. See Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177,
181 (Utah 1997).
4.

Issue. Did the Commission properly determine that Petitioner does
not require back surgery on and industrial basis?

2

Standard of Review:
This is a challenge to the agency's factual findings. An agency's
decision under the substantial evidence test does not require that the
Court review the findings de novo. See Questar Pipeline v. State Tax
Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1175, 1178 (Utah 1993). A party seeking to review an
agency's order must show that the agency's factual determinations are
not supported by substantial evidence. The reviewing court must
examine the facts and all legitimate inferences drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to the agency's findings. See Hales Sand & Gravel v.
Audit Div., 842 P.2d 887 (Utah 1992).

3

DETERMINATIVE LAW
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 (Utah "Workers Compensation Act"),
the provision authorizing workers' compensation for industrial accidents
reads as follows:
An employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who is
injured . . . by accident arising out of and in the course
of the employee's employment, wherever such injury
occurred, if the accident was not purposely
self-inflicted, shall be paid . . . compensation for loss
sustained on account of the injury . . . such amount for
medical, nurse, and hospital services . . . [and]
medicines . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401.
The section emphasized above was interpreted by the Utah
Supreme Court in Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 18, 22-23
(Utah 1986), to require a claimant to prove both medical and legal
causation.
In addition Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-418 reads as follows:
(1) In addition to the compensation provided in this chapter or
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, the employer or
the insurance carrier shall pay reasonable sums for medical,
nurse, and hospital services, for medicines, and for artificial
means, appliances, and prostheses necessary to treat the
injured employee.
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-418.

4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case presents the question whether an employee is entitled to
worker's compensation benefits arising from an industrial accident on
May 12, 1999.
Course of the Proceedings
1.

On February 17, 2007 Ollie M. Blair ("Petitioner") filed an
Application for Hearing requesting medical expenses, recommended
medical care, temporary total compensation, temporary partial
compensation, permanent partial compensation, interest and travel
expenses. The Petitioner claimed that on May 12, 1999 he injured
his low back while working for Precision Tool. (R., 1-7).

2.

Precision Tool, Great American Alliance Insurance Co., and Ohio
Casualty Insurance (collectively, "Respondents") filed an Answer on
March 23, 2007 defending on the grounds that the Petitioner's
surgery is not necessary to treat his industrial injuries. (R., 10-18).
Respondents additionally attached a copy of the Independent
Medical Evaluation of Dr. Gerald Moress to support this defense.

3.

A hearing on this matter was held on July 10, 2007. At the hearing
the parties argued whether the medical care Petitioner sought in

5

his Application for Hearing was medically necessary. See R., 113 at
3-5, 12-15.
4.

The Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") issued Findings of Fact and
Interim Order on October 3 1 , 2007, determining that the case
needed to be sent to a medical panel regarding the necessity of
medical treatment given the divergent opinions of Dr. Jodie Leavitt
and Dr. Gerald Moress. (R., 36-38). The ALJ assigned Dr. Joseph
Q. Jarvis to chair the panel; he associated Dr. Joel Dall as a
member of the panel.

5.

The medical panel reviewed the Interim Findings, medical records,
diagnostics, and examined the Petitioner.

6.

On March 6, 2008, the medical panel issued a report with the
Adjudication Division. (R., 61-63). The medical panel opined the
medical treatment provided to the Petitioner through J u n e 9, 2000
was necessitated by the Petitioner's industrial injuries. However,
after that date, the Petitioner had returned to baseline with his
preexisting degenerative condition (his industrially caused disc
protrusion has resolved) and, therefore, any treatment rendered
after that date was not necessitated by industrially-caused
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conditions. Likewise, the panel found that any times of instability
for work in 2007 were not caused by any industrial injury.
7.

Following this, on March 20, 2007, Petitioner filed an objection to
the medical panel report, objecting to the report because the
medical panel addressed issues of medical causation, an issue
which had already been conceded by the Respondents. (R., 64-70).

8.

On March 28, 2008 Respondents filed a Response to Objections to
the Medical Panel Report. (R., 71-72). Respondents argued that
the panel correctly addressed the primary issue of medical
necessity of surgery due the claimed industrial accident.

9.

On May 6, 2008 the ALJ entered her Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Order. (R., 73-77). The ALJ found Respondents'
arguments persuasive and adopted the medical panel's report. The
ALJ opined that admission of medical causation did not mean that
Respondents were indefinitely liable for all future medical care,
including the proposed surgery of Dr. Levitt.

10.

On J u n e 5, 2008 Petitioner filed an Motion for Review of the ALJ's
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. (R., 78-87).

11.

On J u n e 25, 2008 Respondents filed a Response to the Motion for
Review. (R., 88-94).
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12.

On July 15, 2010 the Commission entered an Order Affirming
ALJ's Decision. (R., 108-111). The Commission agreed with the
ALJ's rationale and affirmed the ALJ's Order.

13.

On August 16, 2010 Petitioner filed a Petition for Review with this
Court.
Statement of Facts
On May 12, 1999, Precision Tool employed the Petitioner as a

welder/fitter. On this date, Petitioner was trying to center a 16M 200 lb.
vertical piece of pipe down into a base plate. A crane held the pipe and
Petitioner pushed and pulled on it with his hands, attempting to position
it correctly. While pushing and pulling on the pipe the Petitioner felt a
pop in his back, which "tightened up." (R., 113 at 19-22). The
Petitioner thought things were alright and finished working his shift.
On May 13, 1999 the Petitioner had pain in his back. He reported
the accident and took the day off. (R., 113 at 22-23)).

Shortly thereafter

the Petitioner went to see Dr. Carston Johnson. (R., 113 at 23 ).
An MRI on September 8, 1999, showed a disc herniation at L5-S1
with thecal sac and exiting nerve root impingement. (R., 113 at 10). The
medical panel determined that the accident apparently caused the disc
protrusion. (R., 62.).
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On February 6, 2007, a repeat MRI showed only degenerative
changes in the Petitioner's low back. The herniation at L5-S1 was gone.
R., 113 at 8-9.). The medical panel determined that the Petitioner's
degenerative disc disease was not caused by the accident. (R., 62.).
Over the years the Petitioner sought treatment for his back now
and then when it would act up. (R., 113 at 45-46).
On April 7, 2006, Mr. Blair was seen by Jodie Levitt, M.D., a
surgeon. Dr. Levitt noted that Mr. Blair's "problems began in around
1988 when he was moving some plate metal. He was told at that time
that he had a herniated disc. More recently he has been having
increasing problems." (R., 113 at 23) Dr.Levitt's report stated, among
other things, that Mr. Blair had significant degenerative disc disease at
L4/5 and that was probably the level giving Mr. Blair his low back pain.
Eventually, Dr. Levitt recommended surgery.

On February 7, 2007 Dr.

Levitt completed a Summary of Medical Record indicating a medical
causal relation between the industrial accident and the Petitioner's
herniated disc. (R., 112 at 18). Dr. Levitt took the Petitioner off work
from May 12, 1999 to May 16, 1999.

She recommended surgery in the

form of left L3-4 and L4-5 laminotomy, decompression and possible
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discectomy. (R., 112 at 18.) Please note, those are not the levels at
which Mr. Blair had the herniated disc after the industrial accident.
Dr. Douglas Davis, D.C. took the Petitioner off work from April 10,
2007 to April 15, 2007. (R., 112 at 41).
On February 5, 2007 Dr. Gerald Moress performed an independent
medical examination. He opined that a laminectomy/discectomy at L3-4
and L4-L5 would not relieve the Petitioner's pain and discomfort. (R., 112
at 16). With regard to past care he opined that all has been necessary
except the chiropractic care. He also opined that the Petitioner was at
maximum medical improvement as of the Independent Medical
Evaluation and that the Petitioner should continue on a self procured
program of spinal stretching, strengthening, and cardiovascular exercise.
A 2-3 week course of physical therapy will refresh the self-program and
provide a good transition. (R., 112 at 17).
Mr. Blair's brief states that the Respondents admitted that the
accident was the medical cause of his low back aggravations and
injuries. That is simply not true. The Respondents' Answer admitted
that Mr. Blair suffered a compensable industrial accident on Mary 12,
1999. (R., at 10-18). The Answer clearly stated the proposed surgery
was not reasonable and necessary to treat the admitted compensable
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injury. 1 The Respondents' Answer also denied that Mr. Blair was entitled
to an award of recommended medical care. In their Pre-Trial
Disclosures, the Respondents clearly stated that their issues included
whether the accident was the cause of Mr. Blair's ongoing complaints of
pain and whether the Petitioner reasonably and necessarily required any
additional medical care to treat the industrial injury. (R., at 32-3).
A hearing on this matter was held on July 10, 2007. (R., 113).
On October 3 1 , 2007, the ALJ issued Findings of Fact and Interim
Order determining that the case needed to be sent to a medical panel
regarding the necessity of medical treatment and any periods of
instability for work. (R., 36-39). Following this, the medical panel issued
its report, which concluded that the medical treatment provided to the
Petitioner through J u n e 9, 2000 was necessitated by the Petitioner's
industrial injuries. However, after that date no additional care was
warranted on an industrial basis.
Following objections filed by Petitioner, the Commission entered an
Order Affirming ALJ's Decision.

(R., 108-111). The Commission agreed

apparently, the Petitioner maintains that an admission of liability as
to an industrial injury renders his employer liable for all of his future care,
even if it is not related to the industrial accident. Recall that the September
8, 1999 MRI showed a herniated disc at L5-S1. Dr. Levitt's proposed
surgery was at L3-4 and L4-5 to treat degenerative processes in Mr. Blair's
spine.
11

with the ALJ and denied Petitioner's claim for additional surgery. The
Commission opined that Respondents' admission that the accident was
the medical cause of Mr. Blair's injury did not preclude the Commission
from adopting the medical panel's findings regarding the extent of Mr.
Blair's work related low back problems. The Commission stated that even
though Respondents admitted that the accident medically caused Mr.
Blair to sustain a low back injury, such an admission does not imply that
the accident caused all of Mr. Blair's low back problems following the
accident. Therefore, the Commission concurred with Judge Marlowe's
decision that Mr. Blair is not entitled to further benefits for his work
related injury.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals should reject Petitioner's arguments and
affirm the Commissions's Order Affirming ALJ's Decision. Respondents'
admission of medical causation does not preclude further challenge to
the extent of further compensability for ongoing medical and indemnity
benefits.

Indeed, the Commission and ALJ applied the appropriate legal

analysis in this case by evaluating Petitioner's claim under Utah Code
Ann. § 34A-2-418. Under this standard, the court properly evaluated
whether the claimant's request for low back surgery was medically
necessary as a result of the industrial accident.
The Commission's determination that Petitioner does not require
surgery on an industrial basis is reasonable and rationale and supported
by substantial evidence in the record including that of the medical panel
and Dr. Gerald Moress. In addition, the Commission's findings are
legally adequate since they cite to the material records that are relevant
to the medical dispute.

13

ARGUMENT
THE LABOR COMMISSION PROPERLY DENIED MR. BLAIRS CLAIM
FOR FURTHER MEDICAL EXPENSES AND TEMPORARY TOTAL
DISABILITY
Point 1:

Admission of Medical Causation Does Not Preclude
Respondents From Challenging the Extent of
Further Compensability

Petitioner incorrectly argues that because Respondents did not
challenge medical causation, they have waived their right to dispute what
medical care is necessitated by the claimed industrial accident. As
correctly determined by both the Administrative Law Judge and the
Commission, Petitioner's argument lacks legal merit and is significantly
flawed.
The ALJ accurately notes in her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Order that while medical causation was conceded, that
admission did not mean that Respondents were liable for all future
medical care for the remainder of Petitioner's life, including the proposed
surgery. Indeed, the ALJ correctly noted that in Respondents' Answer,
they defended Petitioner's Application for Hearing on the grounds that
Petitioner's claim for surgery and associated claim for temporary total
disability was not necessary to treat the industrial accident based upon
the Independent Medical Evaluation of Dr. Gerald Moress. (R., 75).
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Given the divergence of medical opinions between Petitioner's treating
physician, Dr. Leavitt, and that of Dr. Moress, the ALJ correctly remitted
this matter to a medical panel who opined that while the treatment
provided to Petitioner through J u n e 9, 2000 was appropriate on an
industrial basis, after that date Petitioner returned to baseline with his
pre-existing degenerative condition and, therefore, any treatment
rendered after that date was necessitated by non-industrial caused
conditions. (R., 61-63).
The Commission agreed with the ALJ's rationale holding as follows:
Mr. Blair asserts that because Precision Tool admitted that
the accident was the medical cause of his low back injury, the
medical panel's findings related to medical causation are
erroneous and Judge Marlowe's decision to deny further
benefits based upon the panel's report is incorrect. However,
Precision Tool's admission that the accident was the medical
cause of Mr. Blair's injury does not preclude the Commission
from adopting the medical panel's findings regarding the
extent of Mr. Blair's work related low back problems.
Even though Precision Tool admits that the accident
medically caused Mr. Blair to sustain a low back injury, such
and admission does not imply that the accident caused all of
Mr. Blair's low back problems following the accident. After
examining Mr. Blair and reviewing his medical records, the
medical panel determined that Mr. Blair suffered from a preexisting degenerative condition unrelated to his employment
that caused his continuing low back problems. As a result,
the panel concluded that Mr. Blair did not suffer any periods
of instability in 2007 because of his work related injury and
did not require further medical treatment for his work related
injury after J u n e 9, 2000. . . . Therefore, the Commission
15

concurs with Judge Marlowe's decision that Mr. Blair is not
entitled to further benefits for his work related injury.
(R., 109).
Petitioner fails to recognize that under Utah law, once the basic
prima facie elements of compensability are established under Utah Code
Ann. § 34A-2-401, (i.e., accident, medical causation and legal causation),
the issue becomes the extent of liability. See Allen v. Industrial
Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). In this case, medical causation
was admitted as to the initial injury, but the issue as to the extent of
compensability was still at issue. Respondents defended on the basis
that, under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-418, no further treatment was
necessary on an industrial basis. Indeed, this section provides that
medical expenses are only permitted if they are "necessary to treat the
injured employee". This section reads as follows:
(1) In addition to the compensation provided in this chapter or
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, the employer or
the insurance carrier shall pay reasonable sums for medical,
nurse, and hospital services, for medicines, and for artificial
means, appliances, and prostheses necessary to treat the
injured employee.
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-418 (emphasis added).
Utah cases which have interpreted this provision are well settled
that medical benefits will not be awarded to an injured worker when they
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are not necessary to treat the injured employee. See, e.g. Fesler v.
Industrial Commission, 700 P.2d 1116, 1118 (Utah 1985). Such is the
case here where the medical benefits claimed by Petitioner are not
necessary to treat his industrial injuries.
In this case, the ALJ remitted the case directly to a panel of
qualified medical experts for review. The medical panel opined, after
reviewing the complete medical records exhibit and after evaluating
Petitioner, that the proposed surgery claimed by Petitioner to his low
back was not medically necessary on an industrial basis. They stated
that while some of the treatment provided to Petitioner was appropriate
on am industrial basis (i.e, treatment through J u n e 9, 2000), after that
date Petitioner returned to baseline with his pre-existing degenerative
condition and, therefore, any treatment rendered after that date was
necessitated by non-industrial caused conditions. (R., 61-63). The
panel's report was also supported by the medical report of Dr. Gerald
Moress who opined that the laminectomy / discectomy at L3/4 and L4/5
will not relieve Petitioner's discomfort and therefore opined that surgery
would not be a good option for him. Dr. Moress opined that treatment to
February 5, 2007 was appropriate with the exception of chiropractic
care. (R., 112 at 16-17).
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Petitioner additionally argues that the Commission adjudicated
matters that were not raised in the pleadings and "arbitrarily adjudicated
facts not at issue." This is simply not correct. In the Answer to the
Application for Hearing, Respondents specifically challenged Petitioner's
claim for surgery (ie., the extent of medical care) and associated
temporary total disability (R., 10-18). Additionally, this issue was
included in the Petitioner's Pre Trial Disclosures and was fully in
adjudicated at the hearing of this matter. (R., 32,113).

Accordingly,

Petitioner's statement that the ALJ or Commission exceeded their
authority by adjudicating matters not raised in the pleadings is simply
false and a misstatement of the evidentiary record.

In any event, it is

evident under Utah law that administrative pleadings are to be liberally
construed. See Barnard & Burk Group, Inc. v. Labor Comm'n, 2005 UT
App 401, U11 (Utah Ct. App. 2005).
Petitioner further argues that Respondents' failure to challenge
medical causation is an "admission against interest". As noted above,
Petitioner fails to recognize the appropriate legal test. In any event, it is
well settled that formal evidentiary standards do not apply in Labor
Commission proceedings. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-802. Petitioner's
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attempt to challenge on this ground is simply unfounded under Utah
law.
Point 2:

The Commission Applied the Appropriate Legal
Analysis.

Petitioner next argues that the Court should reverse the
Commission's ruling since the Commission applied the wrong legal
standard of medical causation.

The Petitioner cites to the leading case

articulating the standard of medical causation of Allen v. Industrial
Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) and also to two other cases which
articulate the "direct and natural consequences rule" -i.e., McKean v.
Mountain States Casing, 706 P.2d 601 (Utah 1985) and McKesson v.
Labor Commission, 2002 UT App 10, 41 P.3d 468 (Utah Ct. App. 2002).
Citing to McKesson and McKean, Petitioner argues the once medical
causation is established, the employer remains liable for continued
medical treatment if the industrial injury merely contributes to the need
for medical treatment. Petitioner mistakenly cites an incorrect legal
standard. Both McKesson and McKean articulate the standard of
continuing benefits after a compensable industrial accident when the
claimant is later involved in a non-industrial episode.

In those cases,

the Courts were asked to address whether the need for additional
medical care and benefits was the liability of the initial industrial
19

accident when the claimant sustained additional injuries due to a
subsequent intervening accident. For instance, in McKesson the Court
held:
To qualify for additional benefits after suffering a
subsequent aggravation to a compensable work place
injury, a claimant need only prove that his subsequent
injury is a natural result of his compensable primary
injury. [Footnote] Stated more precisely, the claimant
must establish that the subsequent aggravation is
causally linked to the primary compensable injury.
Furthermore, a claimant need not show that his original
tragedy was the sole cause of his subsequent injury.
Indeed, if the claimant can show that the initial
work related accident is merely a contributing cause
of this subsequent injury, the claimant has met his
burden. 2

Id, at f 18. (Emphasis added).
2

In McKesson, the court held that a claimant's subsequent injury to
his neck was the direct and natural consequence of his initial primary
injury and, therefore, awarded additional workers' compensation benefits.
In that case, the claimant had sustained a compensable head injury after
being struck in the head by a 14-pound case and suffered two herniated
discs. Following that accident, the claimant attempted to pull himself u p
into his pick-up truck and hit his head on the truck's door frame,
aggravating his neck injury. The employer argued that this subsequent
accident essentially broke the chain of medical causation, relieving the
employer of additional workers' compensation benefits. The Commission
and the Court of Appeals disagreed and found that the subsequent injury
occurred after a "simple accident brought on by ordinary error and
unintentional miscalculation/' Thus, the Commission concluded that the
subsequent injury was a natural result of his compensable work place
injury, insufficient to relieve the employer of financial responsibility. The
court held that nothing in the record suggested that the claimant's
subsequent injury resulted from "unreasonable conduct".
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In this case the Medical Panel found that Mr. Blair's problems were
due to pre-existing conditions that were not caused by the 1999
accident. (R., 62). His back problems are not related to a non-industrial
aggravation of an industrial injury. The McKesson analysis does not
apply.
In McKean the claimant suffered a compensable industrial hand
injury. However, three months later he had a non-industrial episode
where he sustained new injury from a burn that resulted in blistering.
The Utah Supreme Court, citing to the direct and natural consequences
rule found the carrier liable for the continuing consequences of the new
injury since the claimant was not involved in negligent or intentional
misconduct. McKean, 706 P.2d at 602.
The direct and natural consequences rule articulated in McKesson
and McKean does not apply here. Unlike those cases, Petitioner did not
have any injury subsequent to the claimed industrial accident. Rather,
the standard for compensability of his claim for addition benefits was
properly adjudicated by the ALJ and Commission under Utah Code Ann.
§ 34A-2-418 under a reasonable and "necessary" medical standard.
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Point 3:

The ALJ's Interim Findings of Fact Were Legally
Adequate.

In points 3 and 4 of his Brief, Petitioner challenges the adequacy of
the ALJ's factual findings articulated in her Interim Order. He argues
that the ALJ's failure to reference an eight year history of leg and low
back problems after the accident prejudiced Petitioner. He also argues
that the ALJ improperly abdicated her fact finding obligations to the
panel. Respondents again disagree.
It is well settled that an administrative agency much make findings
of fact and conclusions of law that are adequately detailed so as to
permit meaningful appellate review. See La Sal Oil v. Department

ofEnvtl

Quality, 843 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). In Nyrehn v.
Industrial Commission, this court announced the standard for
administrative agency fact-finding:
In order for u s to meaningfully review the findings of the
Commission, the findings must be sufficiently detailed and
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by
which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was
reached. . . . The failure of an agency to make adequate
findings of fact [***9] on material issues renders its findings
arbitrary and capricious unless the evidence is clear,
uncontroverted and capable of only one conclusion.
800 P.2d 330, 335 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); see also Strate v. Labor Comm'n,
2006 UT App 179, If 16 (Utah Ct. App. 2006).
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The ALJ's findings of fact and Commission's ultimate findings,
which are the subject to challenge, are adequately detailed to reflect the
central issue for determination under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-418 - that
being the necessity of future care in the form of surgery. The ALJ and
Commission's findings detail Petitioner's medical history and the material
medical records which created the dispute necessitating panel review.
The ALJ and Commission noted that Petitioner's treating doctor, Dr.
Levitt recommended surgery in the form of a left L3-4 and L4-5
laminotomy, decompression and possible discectomy. They noted that
Dr. Gerald Moress disagreed with this recommendation. In addition, the
ALJ gave Petitioner's complete medical records to the medical panel for
their review in the Medical Records Exhibit which detailed the nature
and scope of his treatment.
Contrary to Petitioner's argument, there is no requirement under
Utah law that the ALJ or Commission's findings of fact recite every
medical record in the Medical Records Exhibit or, in this case, a full eight
year history.

Indeed, if Petitioner felt that some of his medical history

was improperly omitted he should have filed a motion or objection with
the court to the Interim Order. Likewise, if he felt the questions to the
panel were improper he should have filed an objection to the ALJ's
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charging order of December 19, 2007. He did neither. Indeed,
Petitioner never objected to the alleged deficiencies in the ALJ's Interim
Order nor the questions asked in the charging order under after he
received an unfavorable ruling. Such a wait-and-see approach is
improper and hardly shows any prejudice to him.

In any event, it does

not appear that any of the medical records Petitioner cites alter the
underlying issue of his claim for additional medical care in the form of
surgery nor does it show that the ALJ or Commission incorrectly
evaluated this case. The ALJ and Commission properly cited to those
medical records which were material and relevant to the issues raised
and properly performed their fact finding duties.

Likewise, the ALJ did

not abdicate her fact finding duties to a medical panel as Petitioner
would suggest. In Speirs v. Southern Utah University, the Court held:
[*P9] "To award compensation, the Commission must
determine that an accident has occurred and that there is a
causal connection between the accident and the injury
claimed." Pittsburgh Testing Lab. v. Keller, 657 P.2d 1367,
1370 (Utah 1983). This requires that the Commission make
findings of fact and draw conclusions of law. In difficult cases,
the opinions of a medical panel may be of assistance to the
Commission in determining whether benefits should be
awarded because the medical panel provides the Commission
with the benefit of its medical expertise. See Intermountain
Health Care, Inc., v. Industrial Comm'n, 839 P.2d 841, 845
(Utah Ct. App. 1992); Keller, 657 P.2d at 1370; IGA Food Fair
v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828, 830 (Utah 1978). The medical panel
is empowered to study, take X-rays, and perform tests as it
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may determine necessary or desirable in rendering its
opinion. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-601(2)(a) (Supp. 2002).
[*P10] However, even when a medical panel is convened, the
ALJ/Commission is always the ultimate [***7] fact finder. See
Whitear v. Labor Comm'n, 973 P.2d 982, 986 (Utah Ct. App.
1998); accord IGA Food Fair, 584 P.2d at 830. Thus, while the
ALJ/Commission may convene a medical panel to review
applicants' medical condition, the ALJ/Commission may not
abdicate its fact-finding responsibility to the medical panel.
See Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 731 P.2d 1079,
1084 (Utah 1986).
Speirs v. S. Utah Univ., 2002 UT App 389, P10 (Utah Ct. App. 2002).
The court additionally stated in Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial
Comm'n:
It is not the role of the medical panel to resolve conflicts in
the factual evidence regarding the injured party's activities.
Section 35-1-85 of the Code places that responsibility solely
on the Commission. U.C.A., 1953, § 35-1-85 (1974 ed.).
Under Allen, as before, the medical panel is only to take the
[**13] facts as found by the administrative law judge and
consider them in light of its medical expertise to assist the
administrative law judge in deciding whether medical cause
has been proven. The medical panel strays beyond its
province when it attempts to resolve factual disputes, and the
administrative law judge improperly abdicates his function if
he permits the panel to so act. IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 584
P.2d 828, 830 (Utah 1978).
Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 731 P.2d 1079, 1084 (Utah
1986).
Petitioner argues that the ALJ "foisted" fact finding responsibility
on the medical panel since the ALJ did not cite to every medical record
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within an eight year period after the industrial accident and did not
describe, in detail, the nature and scope of his medical condition, leaving
the panel to "do this job". Petitioner is again mistaken in his argument.
The ALJ was certainly not required to list every medical record contained
in the joint Medical Records Exhibit in her Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Interim Order. The ALJ cited to the material records
relevant to the medical dispute and provided an overview to the panel of
his medical history. The ALJ then remitted this case to the panel to
complete their assignment pursuant to Utah Administrative Code R. 6022-2. Such action was appropriate under Utah law. See Intermountain
Health Care Inc. v. Board of Review, 839 P.2d 841 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
In Intermountain the Court stated that although the medical panel
is responsible for making findings regarding disputed medical aspects of
a compensation claim, its role is limited. The medical panel may not act
as a fact finder in the same way the administrative law judge finds facts,
nor may the panel base its conclusions on the assumption of facts not in
evidence, and the medical panel may not, except in limited
circumstances, assess the credibility of the claimant's testimony.
However, a medical panel acted within its authority in considering all
evidence pertaining to the injury-causing incident and forming a medical
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conclusion based on that evidence. Utah Admin. Code R. 602-2-2. Such
is the case here. The panel did not stray beyond its province in
attempting to resolve a factual dispute; rather, the panel took the facts
as found by the administrative law judge and considered them in light of
their medical expertise to assist the administrative law judge in deciding
what future care was needed on an industrial basis.
Point 4:

The Commissions Finding that Petitioner Does not
Require Back Surgery on an Industrial Basis Is
Supported by Substantial Evidence.

Petitioner also argues that the Commission's finding - that he does
not require back surgery- is not supported by substantial evidence. He
additionally argues that there are insufficient findings defeating his
ability to "marshall" the evidence.
It is well-settled that the Court of Appeals will review the record to
determine if there is substantial evidence to support a Commission's
factual findings. See Commercial Carriers v. Industrial Commission, 888
P.2d 707, 710-11 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Substantial evidence is more
than a scintilla of evidence, though "less than the weight of the
evidence." See id. Substantial evidence is that quantum and quality of
relevant evidence that will convince a reasonable mind to support a
conclusion. See id. To evaluate whether a finding is supported by
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substantial evidence, the court examines the record as a whole, weighing
evidence that both supports and detracts from the finding. See id.
Here, the record shows that there was substantial evidence to
support the Commission's findings that Petitioner does not require low
back surgery on an industrial basis. The Commission found, consistent
with the ALJ, the medical panel, and Dr. Moress that surgery was not
necessary on an industrial basis. The Commission found:
Even though Precision Tool admits that the accident
medically caused Mr. Blair to sustain a low back injury, such
and admission does not imply that the accident caused all of
Mr. Blair's low back problems following the accident. After
examining Mr. Blair and reviewing his medical records, the
medical panel determined that Mr. Blair suffered from a preexisting degenerative condition unrelated to his employment
that caused his continuing low back problems. As a result,
the panel concluded that Mr. Blair did not suffer any periods
of instability in 2007 because of his work related injury and
did not require further medical treatment for his work related
injury after J u n e 9, 2000.
The medical panel's findings are persuasive because the
panel is impartial in this matter, and because its findings are
based on the evidence in the record. The Commission is also
persuaded by the fact that the medical panel had the benefit
of collegial review of Mr. Blair's relevant medical history.
The Commission finds that the medical panel's consideration
of the extend of Mr. Blair's work related injury was
appropriate and adopts the panel's conclusions. Therefore,
the Commission concurs with Judge Marlowe's decision that
Mr. Blair is not entitled to further benefits for his work
related injury.
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In addition the Commission's findings are supported by other
doctors.
For instance, Dr. Gerald Moress opined in his February 5, 2007
report that a laminectomy/discectomy at L3-4 and L4-L5 would not
relieve the Petitioner's pain and discomfort. (R., 112 at 16). Dr. Moress
stated that since Petitioner h a s no clear evidence of radiculopathy, he
would get no relief from the back surgery.

He further opined that the

Petitioner should continue on a self procured program of spinal
stretching, strengthening, and cardiovascular exercise.
Moreover, the medical panel, reviewed Petitioner's complete
medical history and examined Petitioner. The panel opined that
Petitioner's ongoing problems are not related to the industrial injury.
The panel states:
It is agreed (with Dr. Leavitt) that the L4/5 disc is much more
likely causative of his current discomfort, owing to
radiographic appearance. However, the medical panel
disagrees with Dr. Levitt's recommendation for a lumbar
laminectomy an discectomy for what she describes as "mostly
low back pain with some leg pain", agreeing with Dr. Moress
that such a procedure would likely be disappointing to the
patient who has primarily low back pain which would not be
expected to benefit at all from that procedure. That procedure
would be done for degenerative disc disease and not the L5Sl protrusion related to the May 2 1 , 1999 incident.
R., 63.
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These records are sufficient to meet the appropriate legal standard
and convince a reasonable mind that the conclusions of the Commission
are appropriate.

The Court should reject Petitioner's arguments that the

ALJ/Commission's findings are incomplete. In any event, the only
medical records cited by Petitioner to support his argument that he
requires surgery on an industrial basis are those of Dr. Levitt. This
certainly does not meet the marshalling requirement under Utah law.
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998) (requiring appellant
to list all evidence supporting Commission's findings and then
demonstrate that the evidence is inadequate when viewed in light most
favorable to court below). On this basis, Respondents submit that
Petitioner h a s failed in his burden to marshall the evidence in this case.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals should affirm the Commissions's Order
Affirming ALJ's Decision. The Commission and ALJ applied the
appropriate legal standards in evaluating this case under Utah Code
Ann. § 34A-2-418. The Commission's determination that Petitioner does
not require surgery on an industrial basis is reasonable and rationale
and supported by substantial evidence in the record including that of the
medical panel and Dr. Moress.
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Respectfully submitted this J
<v<3^^ i a y of January, 2011

BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC

fomras C. Sturc
Kristy L. Bertelsen
Attorneys for Appellees Precision Tool, Great
American Alliance Insurance; Ohio Casualty
Insurance
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
ADJUDICATION DIVISION
PO Box 146615
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615
801-530-6800
OLLIE M. BLAIR,
Petitioner,
vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
i OF LAW, AND ORDER

Case No. 07-0162
PRECISION TOOL; GREAT AMERICAN
ALLIANCE INSURANCE CO.; OHIO
1
Judge Deidre Marlowe
CASUALTY INSURANCE,
Respondents.

Hearing:
July 10, 2007
Appearances:
Richard Burke for the Petitioner
Thomas Sturdy for the Respondents
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Ollie M. Blair filed an application for hearing on February 17, 2007 requesting medical
expenses, recommended medical care, temporary total compensation, temporary partial
compensation, permanent partial compensation, interest and travel expenses. The Petitioner
claimed that on May 12, 1999 he injured his low back.
Precision Tool, Great American Alliance Insurance Co., and Ohio Casualty Insurance
filed an Answer on March 23, 2007 indicating that Great American had written the policy which
covered Precision Tool at the time of the Petitioner's accident, and that Great American had
assigned the policy to Ohio Casualty Insurance, which is the responsible carrier on the
Petitioner's claim. Respondents concede legal and medical causation. However, they defend on
the grounds that the Petitioner's surgery is not necessary to treat his industrial injuries.
Findings of Fact and Interim Order was issued on October 31, 2007, determining that the
case needed to be sent to a medical panel regarding the necessity of medical treatment and any
periods of instability for work. I assigned Dr. Joseph Q. Jarvis to chair the panel; he associated
Dr. Joel Dall as a member of the panel. The medical panel reviewed the Interim Findings,
medical records, diagnostics, and examined the Petitioner. The medical panel then filed a report
on March 6, 2008 with the Adjudication Division. Copies were promptly distributed to the
parties. The Petitioner filed an objection to the medical panel report on March 20, 2007,
objecting to the report because the medical panel addressed issues of medical causation, an issue
which had already been conceded by the Respondents. The objection is overruled, as discussed
feelow, and the report is admitted into evidence. The case is now ready for final order.
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FINDINGS OF FACT
On May 12, 1999 the Petitioner was working for Precision Tool as a welder/fitter. He
earned $12.43 per hour working 40 hours a week. He was single with 2 dependent children.
This gives the Petitioner an average weekly wage of $497.20 and a temporary total compensation
rate of $341.00.
On May 12, 1999 the Petitioner was trying to center a 16" 200 lb. vertical piece of pipe
down into a base plate. A crane was holding the pipe and Petitioner was pushing on it with his
hands, attempting to position it correctly. While pushing and pulling on the pipe the Petitioner
felt a pop in his back, which "tightened up." The Petitioner thought things were alright and
finished working his shift.
However the next morning the Petitioner had enormous pain in his back. He reported the
accident and took the day off. Shortly thereafter the Petitioner went to see Dr. Carston Johnson.
The Petitioner felt numbness going down the back of his left thigh (the diagram on ME p. 79
showing the pain as in the right thigh is incorrect.)
Over the years the Petitioner sought treatment for his back now and then when it would
"act up." Eventually surgery was recommended by Dr. Jodie Levitt. On February 7, 2007 Dr.
Levitt filled out a Summary of Medical Record indicating a medical causal relation between the
industrial accident and the Petitioner's herniated disc. Dr. Levitt took the Petitioner off work
from May 12,1999 to May 16,1999. He recommended surgery in the form of left L3-4 and L45 laminotomy, decompression and possible discectomy. ME p. 18.
Dr. Douglas Davis, D.C. took the Petitioner off work from April 10,2007 to April 15,
2007. ME p. 41. This is the period for which the Petitioner claims temporary total
compensation.
Dr. Gerald Moress performed an independent medical exam on February 5, 2007. He
opined that a laminectomy/discectomy at L3-L4 and L4-L5 would not relieve the Petitioner's
pain and discomfort. ME p. 16. With regard to past care, all has been necessary except the
chiropractic care. The Petitioner was at maximum medical improvement as of the IME
evaluation. The Petitioner should continue on a self procured program of spinal stretching,
strengthening, and cardiovascular exercise. A 2-3 week course of physical therapy will refresh
the self-program and provide a good transition. ME p. 17.
Findings of Fact and Interim Order was issued on October 31, 2007, determining that the
case needed to be sent to a medical panel regarding the necessity of medical treatment and any
periods of instability for work. I assigned Dr. Joseph Q. Jarvis to chair the panel; he associated
Dr. Joel Dall as a member of the panel. The medical panel reviewed the Interim Findings,
medical records, diagnostics, and examined the Petitioner. The medical panel then filed a report
on March 6,2008 with the Adjudication Division.
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The medical panel opined that the medical treatment provided to the Petitioner through
June 9, 2000 was necessitated by the Petitioner's industrial injuries. However, after that date, the
Petitioner had returned to baseline with his preexisting degenerative condition (his industriallycaused disc protrusion has resolved), and therefore any treatment rendered after that date was not
necessitated by industrially-caused conditions. Likewise, any times of instability for work in
2007 were not caused by any industrial injury.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Causation

Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2-401 provides that an employee who is injured "by
accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's employment" can receive benefits.
In Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15, 27 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court
adopted a two-part test causation analysis suggested by Professor Larson. The first component
deals with "legal causation" while the second addresses "medical causation."
There is no dispute that the incident on May 12,1999 arose by accident out of the course
and scope of the Petitioner's employment with Precision Tool, resulting in injuries, and thus
legal and medical causation requirements are met.
2.

Medical Expenses

Under U.C.A. § 34A-2-418 the employer or the insurance carrier shall pay reasonable
sums for medical, nurse, and hospital services, for medicines, and for artificial means,
appliances, and prostheses necessary to treat the injured employee.
The Petitioner objects that the medical panel, in answering the question of medical
necessity, first examined the question of medical causation. Because the issue of medical
causation was already conceded, the panel should not have evaluated this question. However,
the question put to the medical panel was concerning what care was necessary to treat industrial
conditions. The first thing the panel must determine in answering this question is which
conditions are industrial. It was therefore appropriate for the panel to examine this question.
The panel did opine that industrially-caused conditions no longer need medical care.
This essentially agrees with the opinion given by Dr. Moress that the Petitioner reached
maximum medical improvement and should involve himself in home exercise. These opinions
represent the preponderance of the evidence. I therefore conclude that the Respondents are not
liable for any further medical expenses with regard to this claim.
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3.

Compensation Claims

The preponderance of the evidence shows that the Petitioner's claims for temporary total
compensation in 2007 was not caused by his industrial injuries and thus will be dismissed.
No evidence of other types of compensation claims was put forward at the hearing and
thus these will also be dismissed.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Application for Hearing filed by Ollie Blair against
Precision Tool Great American Alliance Insurance Co., and Ohio Casualty Insurance is
dismissed, with all claims therein denied.
DATED this ^

day of May 2008.

Deidre Marlowe
Administrative Law Judge

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review
within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review.
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission.

Ollie M Blair vs. Precision Tool and/or Great American Alliance Ins Co; Ohio Casualty
Insurance Case No. 07-0162
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW & ORDER was mailed by prepaid U.S. postage on May 6, 2008, to
the persons/parties at the following addresses:
Ollie M Blair
1598 W Palmer Park Ln
South Jordan UT 84095
Precision Tool
175 N 100 E
HyrumUT 84319
Great American Alliance Ins Co
Tom Sturdy Esq Designated Agent
257 E 200 S Ste 800
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Ohio Casualty Insurance
Corp Service Co Designated Agent
Gateway Twr E Ste 900 10 E S Temple
Salt Lake City UT 84133
Richard Burke Esq
7390 S Creek Rd #104
Sandy UT 84093
Thomas Sturdy Esq
257 E 200 S Ste 800
Salt Lake City UT 84111

UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
Clerk
Adjudication Division
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
OLLIE M. BLAIR,
Petitioner,
ORDER AFFIRMING
ALJ'S DECISION

vs.
PRECISION TOOL; GREAT AMERICAN
ALLIANCE INSURANCE CO.; and
OHIO CASUALTY INSURANCE,

Case No. 07-0162

Respondents.

Ollie M. Blair asks the Utah Labor Commission to review Administrative Law Judge
Marlowe's denial of Mr. Blair's claim for benefits under the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act, Title
34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated.
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to §63G4-301 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and §34A-2-801(3) of the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act.
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED
Mr. Blair claims benefits for a low-back injury the he sustained on May 12, 1999, while
working for Precision Tool. Judge Marlowe held an evidentiary hearing, at which Precision Tool
conceded that Mr. Blair had suffered a compensable injury. However, Precision Tool disputed
whether Mr. Blair's continuing low-back problems were work-related and whether he was entitled to
further benefits or medical treatment for his continuing low-back problems.
Judge Marlowe appointed an impartial medical panel to determine the necessity of further
medical treatment and any periods of instability pertaining to Mr. Blair's work-related injury. The
medical panel determined that Mr. Blair's work-related injury did not cause medical instability in
2007 or require further treatment after June of 2000. Judge Marlowe adopted the medical panel's
findings and denied further benefits to Mr. Blair. Mr. Blair challenges Judge Marlowe's decision by
arguing that he is entitled to further benefits because Precision Tool admitted that the accident was
the medical cause of his low-back injury.
FINDINGS OF FACT
On May 12, 1999, Mr. Blair was working for Precision Tool trying to center a 200-pound
pipe into place when he felt a pop in his low back, which then tightened up. Mr. Blair finished his
shift, but experienced severe pain in his low back and numbness in his left thigh following the
accident. Precision Tool paid Mr. Blair's medical expenses as well as permanent partial and

ORDER AFFIRMING ALJ'S DECISION
OLLIE M. BLAIR
PAGE 2 OF 4
temporary total disability compensation following the accident.
Mr. Blair sought occasional treatment for his low back over the next several years. Mr.
Blair's treating physician, Dr. Davis, took Mr. Blair off work from April 10,2007, to April 15,2007,
due to his low-back condition. Another of Mr. Blair's treating physicians, Dr. Levitt, recommended
surgery as treatment for Mr. Blair's continuing low-back problems. Precision Tool's medical expert,
Dr. Moress, evaluated Mr. Blair and opined that surgery would not alleviate Mr. Blair's continuing
low-back problems.
Based on these conflicting medical opinions, Judge Marlowe appointed an impartial medical
panel to determine whether Mr. Blair's work-related injury caused any period of medical instability
or required further medical treatment. The medical panel determined that the treatment Mr. Blair
received through June 9, 2000, was necessary for his work-related low-back injury, but any
subsequent treatment was not related to the accident. The panel also found that any periods of
medical instability in 2007 were not caused by Mr. Blair's work-related injury.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
Mr. Blair claims that he is entitled to further benefits for his work-related low-back injury.
Mr. Blair asserts that because Precision Tool admitted the accident was the medical cause of his lowback injury, the medical panel's findings related to medical causation are erroneous and Judge
Marlowe's decision to deny further benefits based on the panel's report was incorrect. However,
Precision Tool's admission that the accident was the medical cause of Mr. Blair's injury does not
preclude the Commission from adopting the medical panel's findings regarding the extent of Mr.
Blair's work-related low-back problems.
Even though Precision Tool admits that the accident medically caused Mr. Blair to sustain a
low-back injury, such an admission does not imply that that accident caused all of Mr. Blair's lowback problems following the accident. After examining Mr. Blair and reviewing his medical records,
the medical panel determined that Mr. Blair suffered from a pre-existing degenerative condition
unrelated to his employment that caused his continuing low-back problems. As a result, the panel
concluded that Mr. Blair did not suffer any periods of medical instability in 2007 because of his
work-related injury and did not require any further medical treatment for his work-related injury after
June 9, 2000.
The medical panel's findings are persuasive because the panel is impartial in this matter, and
because its findings are based on the evidence in the record. The Commission is also persuaded by
the fact that the medical panel had the benefit of collegial review of Mr. Blair's relevant medical
history. The Commission finds that the medical panel's consideration of the extent of Mr. Blair's
work-related injury was appropriate and adopts the panel's conclusions. Therefore, the Commission
concurs with Judge Marlowe's decision that Mr. Blair is not entitled to further benefits for his workrelated injury.
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ORDER
The Commission affirms Judge Marlowe's decision of May 6, 2008, in this matter. It is so
ordered.
Dated this jS^day

of July, 2010.

Sherrie Hayashi
Utah Labor Commissioner
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order.
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of
the date of this order.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion For Review in the matter of Ollie
M Blair, Case No. 07-0162, was mailed first class postage prepaid this /5**d.ay of July, 2010, to the
following:
Ollie M Blair
1415 Harris Ave
Salt Lake City UT 84104
Precision Tool
175N100 E
HyrumUT 84319
Great American Alliance Ins Co
Tom Sturdy Esq Designated Agent
257 E 200 S Ste 800
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Ohio Casualty Insurance
Corp Service Co Designated Agent
Gateway Twr E Ste 900 10 E S Temple
Salt Lake City UT 84133
Richard Burke Esq
7390 S Creek Rd #104
Sandy UT 84093
Thomas Sturdy Esq
257 E 200 S Ste 800
Salt Lake City UT 84111

fot/fr
Sara Danielson
Utah Labor Commission

